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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
David Ray Cruse appeals from his conviction for domestic battery.

Statement

Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings

The state charged Cruse with attempted strangulation and felony domestic battery,
with a persistent Violator enhancement.

(R., pp. 29-30, 39-40.) Prior

to trial, Cruse

submitted proposed instructions including, among others, a request for an instruction on
the necessity defense.

At

(R., pp. 49-50.) The case proceeded to trial. (R., pp. 148-77.)

the triall the Victim testiﬁed that a series

of arguments escalated until Cruse

—
grabbed her by the throat. (Tr., p. 193, L. 8 p. 200, L. 13.) She found it “[h]ard to breathe,

not able to swallow” and she “started to not be able to focus.” (Tr., p. 200, Ls. 14-20.)

Once released, the Victim ran out of the house. (Tr., p. 201, Ls. 7-10.) Cruse caught her,

“picked [her] up, threw [her] over his shoulders” and carried her back in the house while
she was
—

“kicking and screaming for someone to help and

to call 911.”

(Tr., p. 201, L.

10

p. 203, L. 8.) The ﬁght continued inside with various blows being exchanged both ways

and Cruse again choking her. (Tr., p. 203, L. 9

—

p. 207,

L. 20.)

Karla Castresana, a neighbor, testiﬁed that she heard a woman screaming for help,
and called 911. (Tr., p. 356, L. 14 — p. 359, L. 5.) She looked through the gaps in her fence

in the backyard and saw a woman running and calling for help when a man “grabbed her
and carried her on his shoulder” back inside the house. (Tr., p. 359,

L.

6

—

p. 362, L. 21.)

Because the jury ultimately acquitted Cruse of the strangulation charge and convicted of
only a lesser misdemeanor offense (R., p. 219), the state’s recitation of the testimony at
trial is focused primarily on evidence relevant to the battery count.
1

1

Cruse testiﬁed that the Victim, while “signiﬁcantly intoxicated,” walked toward his
car holding a key fob.

(TL, p. 437, L.

10

—

p. 438,

L. 6.) Cruse grabbed her and “picked

her up” and “carried her about ten feet back to the house” where he set her down outside
the house. (Tr., p. 438,

L.

9

—

p. 439,

L. 3;

p. 455,

L. 24 — p. 457, L. l4.) Cruse admitted

his trial testimony differed signiﬁcantly from what he told police. (Tr., p. 458, L. 22

461, L. 18;

—

p.

State’s Exhibit 8.)

At the jury instruction conference Cruse argued that the necessity defense applied
because “the defendant,

if he did commit any battery, which we would argue he didn’t, was

justiﬁed by the fact he was stopping [the Victim] from driving drunk and potentially
destroying the vehicle which also implicated his livelihood.” (Tr., p. 477, Ls. 13-24.) The

district court ﬁrst found that necessity did not apply to the strangulation count because
Cruse denied having committed that act: “the defendant’s testimony was that he didn’t ever
put his hands on the Victim’s neck. So, in part, he’s not defending on the basis that he acted
out ofnecessity.” (Tr., p. 478, Ls. 7-11; p. 480, Ls. 6-11; p. 481,

L.

14

—

p. 482,

L. 9.) As

to the battery count, the district court found that the defense was covered by other

instructions on excessive force (R., p. 259), self-defense (R., p. 260), and defense of
—
property (R., p. 262). (Tr., p. 482, L. 10 p. 483, L. 1.)

In closing argument, the prosecutor argued that Cruse “admitted Count II on cross-

examination,” and therefore his direct testimony “doesn’t make sense.” (Tr., p. 534, Ls.

21-23.) Cruse objected that the argument was improper because “defendant didn’t admit
to Count II” and the argument was therefore “not in evidence.” (Tr., p. 5 34,

L. 24 — p. 535,

L. 2.) The district court determined the argument was that Cruse “admitted facts which the
prosecution contends results in the admission” and “the State is certainly entitled to argue

what facts they think he admitted.” (Tr., p. 535, Ls. 3-8.) The prosecutor continued,
arguing that Cruse admitted “grab[bing]” the Victim, which is “exactly how the State has
charged Count II.” (Tr., p. 535, Ls. 9-21.)

The jury acquitted Cruse of attempted strangulation (ﬁnding him guilty of an
included misdemeanor battery), but found him guilty of felony domestic battery. (R., pp.

219-20.) Cruse pled guilty to the sentencing enhancement. (Tr., p. 585, L. l7 — p. 593, L.
16.) The district court imposed a sentence of twenty years with ten ﬁxed on the enhanced

felony. (R., pp. 293-96.) Cruse ﬁled a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 298-301.) He also

ﬁled a Rule 35 motion seeking a reduction in sentence, which the district court denied. (R.,
pp. 315-23;

Aug, pp. 1-4.)

ISSUES
Cruse states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court erred [sic] by rejecting Mr. Cruse’s proposed
necessity defense instruction?

II.

Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct?

III.

Was Mr. Cruse’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law
violated because the accumulation of errors deprived him of his right
to a fair trial?

IV.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a uniﬁed
sentence of twenty years, with ten years ﬁxed, upon Mr. Cruse for a
no-injury domestic battery conviction?

V.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Cruse’s
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Cruse failed to show reversible error in the district court’s ruling that the
necessity defense was adequately covered by other defense instructions, namely
protection of self and protection of property?

2.

Has Cruse shown no prosecutorial misconduct?

3.

Has Cruse failed to show cumulative error?

4.

Has Cruse failed to show any abuse of sentencing discretion?

ARGUMENT
I.

Cruse Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Ruling That The Necessig
Defense Was Redundant To The Self-Defense And Protection Of Property Defenses

A.

Introduction

The district court instructed the jury on the afﬁrmative defenses of self-defense (R.,
pp. 202-04), and defense

of property (R.,

p. 205).

It concluded that Cruse’s requested

instruction on necessity was adequately covered by the instructions on these defenses. (Tr.,
p. 482,

L.

10

—

p. 483,

L. 1.) Cruse argues this was error because the facts support giving

the instruction. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-13.) This argument does not address the district

court’s ruling that the justiﬁcation defenses were adequately covered by the given
instructions.

In addressing the district court’s ruling, Cruse claims the defenses have

different elements, and therefore giving the self-defense and defense of property
instructions did not cover the necessity defense. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-15.) Cruse’s

claim that the three defenses have different elements is not supported by law or the facts of
this case. He has ultimately failed to show any theory in this case by which the jury could
have rejected his two other afﬁrmative defenses but accepted his necessity defense.

B.

Standard

Of Review

“The question of whether there is a reasonable View of the evidence that supports
an instruction to the jury on the defense

of necessity is matter of discretion for the district

court.” State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 874, 878, 920 P.2d 391, 395 (1996).

C.

Cruse Has Failed To Show Error In The Jurv Instructions

Review of the elements of the defenses of necessity, self-defense, and defense of
property shows they are virtually identical. The elements of a necessity defense are: (1) an

objective “speciﬁc threat of immediate harm”; (2) circumstances necessitating the illegal
act “must not have been brought about by the defendant”; (3) the avoidance of harm “could
not have been accomplished by a less offensive alternative available to the actor”; and (4)
the “harm caused was not disproportionate to the harm avoided.”

alﬂ State v. Korn,

879, 920 P.2d at 396.
85 (2009) (subjective

128 Idaho at

148 Idaho 413, 417-18, 224 P.3d 480, 484-

belief in immediate harm does not support a necessity defense).

The elements of self-defense are: (1) the defendant “believed that the defendant
was in imminent danger of bodily harm”; (2) the defendant “believed that the action the
defendant took was necessary to save the defendant from the danger presented”; (3) “a

reasonable person, under similar circumstances, would have believed that the defendant

was in imminent danger of bodily injury and believed that the action taken was necessary”;

(4) the defendant “acted only in response to that danger and not for some other motivation”;
and (5) the reasonable appearance of danger was ongoing at the time defendant acted.

v. Jimenez, 159 Idaho 466, 469-70, 362 P.3d 541, 544-45 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing I.C.J.I.

1517).

The elements of defense of property are: (1) conditions “which under the law justify
a person in using force” in defense
the amount

1522.

of “property in the person‘s lawful possession”, and (2)

of force is “reasonably necessary to prevent the threatened injury.” I.C.J.I.

mi LC. §§

19-201, 19-202.

A11

justiﬁed

of these defenses have the same basic structure: comission of an offense is

if the harm prevented is real and imminent and greater than the harm inﬂicted by

the defendant’s actions. This is because all these defenses are variations

of the justiﬁcation

defense. United States V. Leahy, 473 F.3d 401 , 406 (1st Cir. 2007) (“ease in administration

favors treating [the common law defenses of duress, necessity, and self-defense], in a
federal felon-in-possession case, under a single, unitary rubric: justiﬁcation”);
States v. Salgado-Ocamno, 159 F.3d 322, 327 n.6 (7th Cir. 1998), as amended (Nov. 4,

1998) (“necessity, justiﬁcation, duress and self-defense are interchangeably lumped
together under the rubric of the justiﬁcation defense”); Farmer V. Anchorage, No. 6542,
1982

WL 889382, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov.

and defense

17, 1982) (“necessity, defense

of property,

of self” are “justiﬁcation or excuse” defenses because if a defendant “properly

acted in defense of property, out of mistake

of fact, or from necessity, his action would

have been justiﬁed or excused” (quotation marks omitted». Indeed, defense of property

“is a particularized example of a ‘necessity defense’ wherein the accused seeks to justify
his conduct as being ‘immediately necessary’ to prevent another's ‘imminent commission’

of a statutorily listed offense.” Rodriguez v. State, 392 S.W.3d 859,

861

(Tex. App. 2013).

Because Cruse did not offer a justiﬁcation for the battery other than defending himself or
his property (Tr., p. 477, Ls. 13-24), the district court did not err in not giving a generalized

necessity instruction on top of the speciﬁc self-defense and defense of property
instructions.

On appeal Cruse primarily argues that the evidence supported a necessity defense.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-13.) This argument does not address the district court’s ruling,
however. The district court did not rule that there was no evidence to support the giving

of the necessity defense instruction

as to the battery charge, it ruled that the necessity

version of the justiﬁcation defense was covered by the two other justiﬁcation defenses

given, namely self-defense and defense of property. (Tr., p. 482, L. 10

—

p. 483,

L. 1.)

Cruse’s ﬁrst argument is irrelevant because it does not address the district court’s ruling?
Cruse also argues that the district court was “incorrect in concluding that the
necessity defense was adequately covered,” but does not articulate What necessity other
than protecting himself or his property was presented by the evidence. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 13-15.) Because Cruse argued below the necessity was to protect his car (Tr., p. 477,

Ls. 13-24), the district court properly concluded that a general necessity defense instruction
was unnecessary in light of the speciﬁc necessity instruction it was giving on defense of
property. Rodriguez, 392 S.W.3d at 861 (defense of property “is a particularized example

of a ‘necessity defense 9” ). Cruse has failed to show error.
Even

if Cruse had articulated some necessity other than self-defense or defense of

property, any error in not giving a general necessity defense instruction was harmless.

“If

a defendant can demonstrate error, the burden shifts to the State to demonstrate that the

error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Weigle, 165 Idaho 482, 485, 447

P.3d 930, 933 (2019) (quotation marks omitted). Where jury rejection of a given defense
would necessarily show rejection of the requested but not given defense, any error in not

Rodriguez v. State, 524 S.W.3d 389, 395

giving the requested defense is harmless.

2

Cruse also does not challenge the district court’s ruling that the necessity defense did not
apply to the strangulation charge because Cruse denied committing that underlying crime.
Therefore, that ruling must stand and the conviction on the included offense therefore must
be afﬁrmed. Rich v. State, 159 Idaho 553, 555, 364 P.3d 254, 256 (2015) (“Where a lower
court makes a ruling based on two alternative grounds and only one of those grounds is
challenged on appeal, the appellate court must afﬁrm on the uncontested basis”).
Moreover, it was the correct ruling.
infra, pp. 11-12.
8

(Tex. App. 2017) (“Appellant has not identiﬁed, and we cannot ﬁnd, any evidence in the
record speciﬁc to appellant’s necessity defense such that the jury might have rejected

appellant’s self-defense theory While accepting his necessity theory”).
In this case the jury necessarily concluded the defenses of self-defense and defense

of property were disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. (R., pp. 202-05, 220.) As shown
above, the three eyewitnesses to the crime (the Victim, Cruse, and the neighbor) all testiﬁed
that Cruse grabbed the victim and carried her. Two

of the witnesses, the victim and the

neighbor, testiﬁed this happened in the back yard opposite where the car was parked, while

only Cruse claimed the Victim was moving toward his car in the front. By rejecting the
defense

of property defense,

the jury necessarily concluded either

(l) that conditions did

not “justify [Cruse] in using force in defense” of his car or (2) that the force Cruse used
was not “reasonably necessary to prevent the threatened injury.”

(R., p. 205.) The jury’s

rejection of the defense of property defense would necessarily have resulted in the rejection

of any other necessity of using force to stop the victim from driving Cruse’s car.
The district court correctly concluded that two justiﬁcation defenses covered the
range of possible justiﬁcations for the battery. The district court properly concluded that

giving the general necessity defense instruction was unnecessary because it was already
giving a specialized form of the necessity defense, the defense of property. Even if Cruse
had articulated a necessity outside

harmless because

of protection of property and self, any error was

if he was not justiﬁed in using force to protect the car or himself, he was

not justiﬁed in using force to prevent the victim from accessing the car generally. Cruse
has failed to show error, and even

if there were error it was necessarily harmless.

Cruse Has Shown No Error In The Disgrct Court’s Ruling On The Prosecutor’s
Argument That Cruse Had Admitted Committing Domestic Battery

A.

Introduction
In closing argument, the prosecutor argued Cruse had “admitted” the battery charge

by testifying that he had grabbed the Victim and carried her. (Tr., p. 5 34, Ls. 21 -23; p. 535,

Ls. 9-21.) Cruse objected that the argument was “not in evidence.” (Tr., p. 534, L. 24 — p.
5 35,

L. 2.) The district court determined the argument was that Cruse “admitted facts

which the prosecution contends results in the admission” and “the State is certainly entitled
to argue what facts they think he admitted.” (Tr., p. 5 35 , Ls. 3-8.)

On appeal Cruse argues the district court erred because Cruse did not admit he

“unlawfully” grabbed the Victim, but had asserted “multiple afﬁrmative defenses” claiming
his battery was justiﬁed. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-17.) However, the prosecutor was not
even addressing his afﬁrmative defenses or the lawﬁllness of the battery. Because Cruse

did admit committing the battery, the argument was proper.

B.

Standard

Of Review

“Where, as here, there has been a contemporaneous objection to prosecutorial
misconduct, we determine whether the challenged conduct constitutes misconduct, and

if

so, whether the error was harmless.” State V. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 574, 181 P.3d 496,

500 (Ct. App. 2007).

C.

The Prosecutor’s Argument Was Proper

“There is considerable latitude in closing argument, and both sides are entitled to
discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences that should

10

be drawn ﬁom it.”

State V. Alwin, 164 Idaho 160, 169, 426 P.3d 1260, 1269 (2018)

(quotation marks and ellipse omitted). “Generally, both parties are given wide latitude in

making their arguments to the jury and discussing the evidence and inferences to be made
therefrom.” State V. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 274, 429 P.3d 149, 162 (2018) (quotation
marks omitted).

6“

[A] court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous

remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy
exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations.”’
State V. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 719, 215 P.3d 414, 439 (2009) (brackets added, quoting

Donnellv v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974)). Review shows that the prosecutor
was within the latitude allowed in proper closing argument.

First, Cruse factually admitted that he committed the crime of domestic battery by
grabbing his co-habiting ﬁance and carrying her. (Tr., p. 437, L. 10 — p. 439, L. 3; p. 455,

L. 24 — p. 45 7, L. 14.) There was nothing improper in the argument pointing this out. (Tr.,
p. 534,

Ls. 21-23; p. 535, Ls. 9-21.)
Second, Cruse legally admitted having committed the charged domestic battery.

Idaho follows the rule that justiﬁcation defenses require the defendant to admit having

committed the crime in order to claim he had been justiﬁed in doing so.

State v. Barton,

154 Idaho 289, 291-92, 297 P.3d 252, 254-55 (2013) (entrapment defense available only

to defendant who admits the offense).

alﬁ Galvan v. People, 476 P.3d 746, 753 (Colo.

2020) (“When a defendant relies on an afﬁrmative defense, he essentially admits the
commission of the elements of the charged offense but seeks to justify, excuse, or mitigate
his conduct”); John B. v. Comm’r of Correction, 222 A.3d 984, 999 (Conn. App. 2019)
(asserting an afﬁrmative defense admits “commission of the crime” and “necessarily”

11

concedes that “each of the individual elements comprising the offense is satisﬁed”

(quotation marks omitted)); People V. McLennon, 957 N.E.2d 1241, 1245 (Ill. App. 2011)

(when asserting an afﬁrmative defense, the defendant “admits to the offense but denies

responsibility”); People V. Dupree, 788 N.W.2d 399, 405 n.11 (Mich. 2010) (“An
afﬁrmative defense admits the crime but seeks to excuse or justify its commission. It does
not negate speciﬁc elements of the crime”); 115 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 309 (originally

published in 2010) (“Necessity or choice of evils is an afﬁrmative defense because it
requires the defendant's belief that the violation of the law was necessary. Accordingly, in
order to invoke the necessity defense, the defendant must admit to having committed a

crime.” (italics added)). Again, the prosecutor was well within bounds by arguing that
Cruse had admitted committing a domestic battery.

The prosecutor’s argument was nothing more than pointing out what Cruse had
both legally and factually done: admitted committing a domestic battery by grabbing and

carrying his co-habiting ﬁance just after she left the house. (Tr., p. 534, Ls. 21-23; p. 535,

Ls. 9-21.) The district court correctly overruled Cruse’s objection to this argument. (Tr.,
p. 535,

Ls. 3-8.)
Cruse argues the prosecutor’s argument was improper because he had not admitted

committing the domestic battery “unlawfully.” (Appellant’s brief, p. l7.) Although it is
true that Cruse maintained that his actions were justiﬁed, he had both factually and legally

admitted committing the crime of domestic battery.

It was not improper, where the

defendant factually and legally admits all the acts and mental state constituting the crime,

but asserts only that his acts were justiﬁed as defense of self or property, to argue that the
defendant has “admitted” committing the crime.

12

Finally, even if Cruse had demonstrated that the argument was somehow improper,
any resulting error was harmless. An error will be found harmless

if the state demonstrates

that “the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” W_eigl_e, 165 Idaho at 485, 447 P.3d
at 933 (quotation marks omitted). The district court instructed the jury on self-defense and

the specialized necessity defense

of defense of property. (R., pp. 202-05 .) Cruse’s counsel

argued these defenses to the jury. (Tn, p. 555,

L. 11.) The jury listened
p. 439,

L.

17

—

p. 556,

L. l; p. 562, L.

14

—

to what Cruse actually stated on the stand. (Tr., p. 437,

p. 565,

L.

10

—

L. 3; p. 455, L. 24 — p. 457, L. 14.) This Court may conclude beyond a reasonable

doubt that the prosecutor’s argument did not cause the jury to (1) conclude that Cruse

admitted his actions were unlawful while testifying and (2) ignore his defenses in

deliberations.

The prosecutor’s argument that Cruse had admitted the domestic battery was true
as a matter

of fact and as a matter of law. The district court properly overruled Cruse’s

objection that it was not supported by the evidence. Even

if potentially

erroneous, any

error was harmless because Cruse’s defenses were presented to the jury in both instructions
and argument.

III.

Cruse Has Shown No Cumulative Error
Cruse asserts he is entitled to a new trial under the cumulative error doctrine.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 18.) “Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors,
harmless in and of themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.

However, a necessary predicate to the application of the doctrine is a ﬁnding of more than
one error.”

State v. Per_ry, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2010) (citations

13

omitted). Cruse has failed to show any error, much less two errors. Even

if the

district

court erred by not giving a general necessity instruction and overruling Cruse’s objection
to the prosecutor’s closing argument were errors, Cruse has failed to show that his trial was

unfair.

IV.
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion

A.

Introduction

The district court imposed a sentence of twenty years with ten years ﬁxed on

Cruse’s conviction for domestic battery, enhanced for being a persistent violator. (R., pp.
293-96.) Cruse thereafter ﬁled a Rule 35 motion seeking a reduction in sentence, which
the district court denied.

(R., pp. 315-23; Aug, pp. 1-4.)

On appeal Cruse contends his enhanced sentence is excessive because of

“mitigating factors.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 18-21.) He also argues the district court
abused its discretion in not granting his motion for reduction

of sentence in light of

evidence of family and community support. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 22-23.) Application of
the relevant law and review

B.

Standard

of the record show no abuse of discretion.

Of Review

“When reviewing whether a sentence is excessive, we review all the facts and
circumstances in the case and focus on whether the trial court abused its discretion in ﬁxing
the sentence.” State v. Fisher, 162 Idaho 465, 467, 398 P.3d 839, 841 (2017) (quotation

marks omitted). The four factors of the abuse of discretion standard are whether the trial
court

“(1) correctly perceived

the issue as one

of discretion; (2) acted within the outer

boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to
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the speciﬁc choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise

State V. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661,

C.

_,

of reason.”

462 P.3d 1125, 1144 (2020).

The Sentences Are Reasonable And Within The Trial Court’s Discretion

“Generally, when appealing a sentence as an abuse of discretion, the appellant must
establish that, under any reasonable View of the facts, the sentence was excessive

considering the objectives of criminal punishment.” State v. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605,
608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2019) (quotation marks omitted). “Those objectives are (1)
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the

possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong-doing.”
Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 591, 448 P.3d 1005, 1019 (2019) (quotation marks omitted).

“Further, a sentencing court's decision to treat a sentencing factor as mitigating or
aggravating is a factual one” that will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. GLcia,
166 Idaho at

__,

462 P.3d at 1144 (quotation marks omitted).

standards to the district court’s sentencing shows no abuse

Application of these

of discretion.

The district court found that Cruse had a history of domestic violence against
women. (Tr., p. 641, L. 22 — p. 644, L. 17.) The district court found Cruse’s trial testimony

“not to be credible,” and the real reason Cruse had carried the victim back to the house was
to prevent her from contacting the police because he was on probation. (Tr., p. 644,
—

p. 646,

L.
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L. 5.) Indeed, had the neighbor not called the police it was possible the entire

incident would not have come to light. (Tr., p. 652, Ls. 8-19.)

Based on the domestic Violence evaluation, the district court found Cruse to be a

high risk to commit future domestic violence. (Tr., p. 646, Ls. 6-13.) The district court
found that the root of Cruse’s offense was not “just about alcohol,” but was instead because
15

of “bad character.” (Tr., p. 646, L. 14-16.) Cruse had “Violat[ed] terms of [his] probation”
and “not responded to the treatment options,” and the court found that rehabilitation had

“not been successﬁil.”

(Tr., p. 646, Ls. 16-21.)

Despite probation and efforts at

rehabilitation, Cruse continued to “drink” and “engage in manipulative and bad behavior.”

(Tr., p. 646, Ls. 21-25.)
The district court speciﬁcally applied the goals of sentencing and the relevant Idaho
Code. (Tr., p. 647, L. 16 — p. 649, L. 6.) The district court then concluded that “considering

all of those factors and principally the protection of society,” as well as Cruse’s history of
crimes, riders, and probations, the public would not be protected “absent a very long prison
sentence.” (Tr., p. 649, Ls. 7-14.) The district court then imposed a sentence of 20 years

with ten years determinate on the felony conviction and enhancement. (Tr., p. 649, L. 25
—

p. 650,

L. 2.) The district court recognized the sentence was “harsh,” but did not in “good

conscience” believe a lesser sentence “would have the ability to protect the public.” (Tr.,
p. 650,

Ls. 16-23.)
The record supports the district court’s ﬁndings. Cruse has an extensive history of

criminal behavior, much of it involving violence or alcohol or both, including four prior

felony convictions. (PSI, pp. 361-63, 369-72, 382-853) He has been on probation several
times and did two prior riders, and was on probation when he committed the instant
offenses.

(Id.) His domestic violence evaluation rated him a “[h]igh risk” to commit

additional domestic violence. (PSI, p. 377.) The district court’s ﬁndings are supported by
the record, and the facts found by the court show it did not abuse its discretion in imposing

a sentence

3

of 20 years with ten ﬁxed.

Citations to the PSI are to the electronic ﬁle “Conf.Docs.-Cruse.PDF.”
1

6

Cruse argues that “mitigating factors” show the district court abused its discretion.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 19.) The ﬁrst such “mitigating factor” Cruse claims is that the facts

of the offense

are not serious because his conviction “started out as a misdemeanor

domestic battery without traumatic injury” in which the Victim was not injured but “broke
a beer glass over Mr. Cruse’s head.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-20.) Cruse’s attempts to

minimize the violence he inﬂicted on the Victim cannot be countenanced. The district court

speciﬁcally found that the Victim’s recitation of events was credible and Cruse’s account

of those same events was not credible. (Tr.,

p. 644,

L.
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—

p. 645,

L. 18.) Rather than

meet his burden of showing clear error, Cruse ignores the district court’s ﬁndings and

improperly invites this Court to substitute his version of events.
Second, Cruse argues he had a “difﬁcult and extremely traumatic childhood, rife

with violence.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 20.)

However, the only evidence of Cruse’s

childhood was a self-report from Cruse (PSI, pp. 354-55), whom the district court found to
be not credible. Additionally, even

Cruse was

if true, Cruse’s

childhood was not really mitigating.

. (PSI, p. 379.) He was decades removed from his childhood. And

he had ﬁlled those decades with crimes, Violence, and failed probations. (PSI, pp. 361-63,

369-72, 382-85.)

If this

factor was mitigating, it was mitigating early in this history. It

was not mitigating in this case.

Third, Cruse blames his alcohol abuse. (Appellant’s brief, p. 20.) Once again,
however, he merely ignores the district court’s contrary factual ﬁndings. As noted above,
the district court found the violence more

of an issue of character than of alcohol. (Tr., p.

646, L. 14-16.) The district court also found that probation and rehabilitation efforts, which

included addressing alcohol abuse, had failed. (Tr., p. 646, Ls. 16-21.)

17

Fourth, Cruse argues he had “supportive family to assist him in rehabilitation.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 20.) Presumably this same family was there to support him in past
probations and treatment. (PSI, pp. 361-63, 369-72, 382-85.) That family support has
done little to nothing to facilitate rehabilitation or protect the community in the past likely

indicates that it would not do so going forward.

Finally, Cruse cites his expressions of remorse. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-21.)
Again, the district court found Cruse not credible and motivated by desire to avoid
punishment. (Tr., p. 644, L. 18

—

p. 646,

L. 5.) Furthermore, either past remorse for his

prior crimes and Violence has not led to change, or he is just now, after years of Violence,
starting to feel remorse for his actions. Neither provides meaningful mitigation.

The district court focused on Cruse’s history of violence, particularly domestic
violence, and concluded that societal protection required a very long sentence. On appeal
Cruse does not directly address the district court’s analysis. Because the facts and the law
show the sentence to be reasonable, Cruse has shown no abuse of discretion.

D.

Cruse Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In The Denial Of His Motion To Reduce
The Sentence

A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency,
addressed to the sound discretion

of the court. State v. Knighton,

143 Idaho 318, 319, 144

P.3d 23, 24 (2006); State v. Allbee, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989).
In presenting an I.C.R. 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive

in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in
support

of the motion. State v. Huffman,

144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).

Cruse supported his Rule 35 motion with correspondence from family, friends, and
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an employer.

(R., pp. 318-23.) The district court denied the motion, ﬁnding that the

sentence imposed was “appropriate,” and the letters did not “justify leniency.” (Aug., p.

4.) Cruse argues that the reduction should have been granted “in light of” the letters and
the mitigating factors he identiﬁed in relation to his initial sentencing. (Appellant’s brief,

pp. 22-23.) However, his appellate argument does not really address the core reason for
the sentence—the need to protect society.

Support by Cruse’s family and friends has

simply not led to his rehabilitation or the protection of society. Cruse has failed to show
any abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to afﬁrm the district court’s judgment and
order denying Cruse’s Rule 35 motion.

DATED this 20th day of January, 2021.
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